Besides their phenomenological costs, social exclusion and avoidance restrict offenders’ access to benefits offered by coalitional allies (including the punisher). Such indirect behaviors are often intended to impose costs on offenders 21, 25, 26, and they involve a host of negative experiences for their targets 27, 28. Gossip, exclusion, and avoidance can be employed in the absence of the offender and hence involve lower costs than confrontational punishment, in that they are less likely to elicit retaliation 25. In contrast, indirect punishment strategies such as gossip and social avoidance 13, 14, 15 are less risky. ![]() At the same time, direct punishment can swiftly remove threats and effectively adjust offenders’ behavior 5, 23-whether by physically deterring offenders or by verbally communicating disapproval and condemnation to them 24. To illustrate, direct punishment strategies, which are overt and involve physical or verbal confrontation of offenders, are risky 20, 21, because they expose one to retaliation 22. Another possibility is that, upon detecting a norm violation, people enact specific punishment strategies, conditional on factors that shift the costs and benefits of punishment. That is, people may randomly choose among punishment strategies or merely use those strategies that are available. When do people deploy different forms of punishment? One possibility is that, when norm violations are detected, people use distinct punishment strategies in an unconditional manner. In more ecologically valid settings, a host of factors-relational, situational, and emotional-can influence the use of punishment. However, most empirical observations on punishment come from interactions in laboratory settings 9, 11, 19 which, while well-controlled, lack many aspects of the real-world ecologies in which punishment occurs. These accounts argue that various forms of punishment-costly punishment 2, 9, 11, gossip 13, 14, and social exclusion 15, 16-can effectively deter cheating and promote norm abidance 9, 17, 18. Theoretical accounts suggest that cooperation is maintained via direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and/or partner choice 12. ![]() Despite its ubiquity and consequences, little is known about the factors underlying punishment in natural settings. Such punishment can confer benefits to those who mete it out (e.g., deterrence, status, and reputation) 5, 6, 7, 8 and to their groups (e.g., resource preservation and public goods provision) 9, 10, 11. In response, people are often motivated to impose costs on offenders via punishment 2, 3, 4. ![]() Communities and individuals regularly face norm-violating behaviors (e.g., free-riding and littering 1). A key challenge to the evolution and maintenance of cooperation involves deterring cheaters and regulating norm violations.
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